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Abstract. 
Computer forensics faces a range of challenges due to the widespread use of 
computing technologies. Examples include the increasing volume of data and 
devices that need to be analysed in any single case, differing platforms, use of 
encryption and new technology paradigms (such as cloud computing and the 
Internet of Things). Automation within forensic tools exists, but only to perform 
very simple tasks, such as data carving and file signature analysis. Investigators 
are responsible for undertaking the cognitively challenging and time-consuming 
process of identifying relevant artefacts. Due to the volume of cyber-dependent 
(e.g., malware and hacking) and cyber-enabled (e.g., fraud and online 
harassment) crimes, this results in a large backlog of cases. With the aim of 
speeding up the analysis process, this paper investigates the role that 
unsupervised pattern recognition can have in identifying notable artefacts. A 
study utilising the Self-Organising Map (SOM) to automatically cluster notable 
artefacts was devised using a series of four cases. Several SOMs were created – 
a file list SOM containing the metadata of files based upon the file system, and a 
series of application level SOMs based upon metadata extracted from files 
themselves (e.g., EXIF data extracted from JPEGs and email metadata extracted 
from email files). A total of 275 sets of experiments were conducted to determine 
the viability of clustering across a range of network configurations. The results 
reveal that more than 93.5% of notable artefacts were grouped within the rank-
five clusters in all four cases. The best performance was achieved by using a 
10x10 SOM where all notables were clustered in a single cell with only 1.6% of 
the non-notable artefacts (noise) being present, highlighting that SOM-based 
analysis does have the potential to cluster notable versus noise files to a degree 
that would significantly reduce the investigation time. Whilst clustering has 
proven to be successful, operationalizing it is still a challenge (for example, how 
to identify the cluster containing the largest proportion of notables within the 
case). The paper continues to propose a process that capitalises upon SOM and 
other parameters such as the timeline to identify notable artefacts whilst 
minimising noise files. Overall, based solely upon unsupervised learning, the 
approach is able to achieve a recall rate of up to 93%.  
Keywords: SOM, digital forensics, automation, clustering, self-organising 
map, cybercrime 
1 Introduction 
Over the last 15 years, computing technologies have experienced significant change in 
terms of variety of devices (e.g., computers, smartphones and tablets), data capacity 
(e.g., storing up to and beyond 2 Terabytes (TB) of data), functionality (e.g., office, 
web browsing and mobile apps), and the number of users. Indeed, the use of computing 
devices has integrated into every aspect of daily life such as email, banking, 
entertainment, shopping, and micro-payments. Unfortunately, in parallel with this, the 
types and sophistication of computer assisted cybercrimes have also grown 
significantly, from the traditional child pornography, fraud, and money laundering to 
carefully planned cyberattacks (e.g., government espionage, cyber warfare, and identity 
theft). Inevitably, the consequence of these cybercrimes can be severe. For UK 
businesses alone, cyberattacks are claimed to have cost £34 billion in lost revenue in 
2014 (Veracode, 2015).  
Digital Forensics has become an invaluable tool in the identification of 
cybercriminal activities due to its ability to extract valuable information and evidence 
from computing devices in a legally acceptable manner (Casey, 2010). As a result, it 
has been widely used by law enforcement agencies and organisations to track and 
investigate computer-assisted and cybercriminal activities (Inforsecusa, 2011; Brainz, 
2014; RCFL, 2014). 
However, digital forensics experiences growing challenges from several aspects, 
including the growing size of data storage, the prevalence of embedded flash storage, 
the need to analyse multiple devices, the use of encryption, and the popular usage of 
cloud computing (Casey and Stellatos, 2008; Garfinkel, 2010). Statistics from the FBI’s 
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL) show that they had processed 5,973 
TBs of data from 7,273 examinations in 2013 – a 40% increase in comparison with 
2011 (FBI, 2013). Despite their effort, an audit report of the Office of the Inspector 
General U.S. Department of Justice highlights that a backlog of 1,566 outstanding cases 
existed, 57% of which had waited between 91 days to over 2 years (Office of the 
Inspector General, 2015). Unfortunately, the consequence of such backlogs could cause 
a number of implications, both legal and personal. 
In order to reduce the overall examination time, many forensic tools have been 
developed both commercially or under open source licence agreements, such as EnCase 
(Guidance Software, 2015), Forensics Toolkit (FTK) (AccessData, 2015), P2 
Commander (Paraben Corporation, 2015), Autopsy (Carrier, 2015), HELIX3 (e-fense, 
2014), and Free Hex Editor Neo (HHD Software, 2015). The majority provide the 
“Push-Button Forensics” facility to automate several key procedures of the forensic 
process, including preservation, collection, and presentation. Despite the assistance of 
these tools, digital evidence examiners still have to manually analyse the data (e.g., 
documents, emails, and internet history) contained on the image to find potential 
evidence; however, this process is time consuming and prone to human-error. Also, it 
is the responsibility of the investigator to cognitively analyse the data and understand 
the inter-relationships that exist between artefacts. On cases with a growing volume of 
data, this places an ever-increasing burden upon the investigator. Indeed, this has led 
many law enforcement agencies to strategically change their approach away from the 
‘gold standard’ (analysing all files to ensure nothing is overlooked) to ‘intelligence-
based’, where a subset of files are analysed dependent upon the intelligence provided 
to the investigator (Lawton et al, 2014). It is no longer about finding every piece of 
evidence but rather sufficient evidence to determine innocence or guilt. To this end, 
this paper describes a novel analysis approach that utilises the Self-Organising Map 
(SOM) technique to automatically group artefacts of interest together, enabling 
investigators to focus specifically on notable files (i.e., those that are relevant to the 
case) and hence reduce the time spent on analysing irrelevant files. The approach is 
based upon utilising the metadata from a variety of sources, such as the file system (e.g. 
pathname, file type, and Modification, Access and Creation (MAC) timestamps) and 
email (e.g. to, from, and attachment present) as an input into the SOM clustering. An 
experiment is presented to illustrate whether clustering is a viable approach to 
identifying notable artefacts.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the existing 
work surrounding the use of SOM clustering with respect to digital forensics. Section 
3 describes the datasets that were utilised in the experiment, with Section 4 presenting 
the experimental results of the SOM study. Section 5 presents a novel process that 
applies SOM in practice and presents an evaluation of the approach using the 
aforementioned datasets. A comprehensive discussion on the impact of the results in 
practice is presented in Section 6, prior to the conclusion and future work. 
2 Related Work  
A SOM is a neural network that produces a mapping from the high dimensional input 
data into a regular two dimensional array of nodes based upon their similarity 
(Kohonen, 1998). Due to its competitive learning nature, SOM can automatically 
classify the input data without any supervision. Since its invention, SOM has been 
extensively used in many computer security related fields, including intrusion 
detection, biometrics, and wireless security (Feyereisl and Aickelin, 2009). The use of 
SOM within the digital forensic domain can be traced back in the early 2000s, where 
police were able to link records of serious sexual attacks together (Adderley and 
Musgrove, 2001). Since then, a number of studies were devised to investigate the ability 
of SOM for digital forensic investigations. 
Fei et al (2005) and Fei et al (2006) explored the use of SOM as a supporting 
technique to interpret and analyse data generated by computer forensic tools in a 
visualised manner. In their studies, a public dataset containing 2,640 graphical images 
was utilised; each image contained four features: the file name, extension, creation 
time, and creation date. SOM clustered the data after being manually enumerated, 
producing various two dimensional maps. These visualisations enabled digital evidence 
examiners to locate interesting information in a more efficient and accurate manner. 
However, experimental results were not presented in detail to highlight the efficiency 
and accuracy of their proposed approach. 
With the purpose of improving the result of text-based searches, Beebe and Clark 
(2007) proposed a novel method that utilised SOM to post-retrieval cluster text string 
search results within a forensic image. In order to test their hypothesis, a software tool 
(named “Grouper”) was developed. Grouper was able to perform a number of activities, 
including data preparation and SOM clustering. Experimentally, two datasets were 
utilised: one was a real-world divorce case and the other was an artificially created 
murder case; their image sizes were 40 and 10 Gigabytes (GB) respectively. Results 
demonstrated that the approach can be used to reduce the human analytical time by 
around 80% despite additional computer processing time being required (Beebe et al, 
2011). 
Kayacik and Zincir-Heywood (2006) created a topological model of known attacks 
for forensic analysis of anomalous network traffic by employing the SOM algorithm. 
Their model was tested by using the KDD 99 intrusion detection dataset. The results of 
their empirical study show that attacks can be successfully grouped by SOM with an 
overall high accuracy (i.e., 89.8%). Also, they suggested that the model can be utilised 
for analysing new attacks or suspicious network behaviour.  
Similarly, Palomo et al (2011) focussed upon the analysis and visualisation of 
network traffic data via the use of SOM to identify abnormal behaviour or intrusions. 
For their experiment, a dataset with 150,871 packet samples was created by monitoring 
a university network via WireShark during a four-day period; each sample contained 
nine features, including the IP addresses of source and destination, port numbers, 
protocol type, date and time stamps, and packet length. The data was clustered using 
SOM with various network configurations (e.g., 3x3 and 5x5 network sizes). Their 
experimental results demonstrate that suspicious network traffic was identified by SOM 
providing vital information for network forensic examiners.  
Wang et al (2015) proposed a graphical model to analyse the relationship between 
criminals through SOM visual analytics. Their model was evaluated using a dataset 
with 16,383 features of 16 suspects. Within the model, SOM was used to reduce 
features and provide a visual aid to investigators for better understanding of suspect’s 
activities. According to their experimental results, the proposed model can offer 
assistance for a more efficient forensic analysis. Nonetheless, the degree of assistance 
to which the model was able to offer was not clearly provided.  
As illustrated above, SOM has been used in several digital forensic domains, 
including image analysis, network forensics, and text-based searching. The results 
suggest that SOM can be used successfully to assist the forensic examiners, such as in 
the visualisation of artefacts and the reduction of human analytical time. Nevertheless, 
the ability to use SOM to analyse a forensic image specifically tasked with identifying 
notable files using metadata extracted at the file system and application levels has never 
been undertaken.  
3 Datasets 
In order to investigate the ability of using SOM to cluster notable artefacts, four forensic 
cases were utilised: two public and two private. Whilst it would have been useful to 
utilise a larger number of cases, the availability of these (for obvious legal and privacy 
reasons) is very limited. It is the purpose of this paper however to analyse the feasibility 
of clustering notable artefacts rather than provide a definitive empirical study on how 
well this can be achieved more generally. In all four cases, the forensic images acquired 
are from the suspects’ systems (not the victims’). This is important because the 
proposed novel algorithm in Section 5 is based upon an underlying assumption that a 
suspect will perform a series of criminally-related activities rather than a single action 
at any point in time (e.g. looking at child abuse imagery is likely to involve looking at 
many images rather than a single image in isolation or the composition of a letter for 
blackmail will result in the letter being emailed or printed rather than in being produced 
merely for the sake of it). On a victim’s machine, this assumption is unlikely to hold 
true. The first public case (Case 1) was the “Hunter XP” provided by Guidance 
Software as a training case. This case is an artificial case describing a 
blackmail/stalking incident in which suspects demanded a ransom. The second public 
case (Case 2) was a hacking case that was artificially generated by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) also for training purposes (NIST, 2013). Regarding 
the two private cases, they were obtained from the Sultanate of Oman - Public 
Prosecution. One was a document fraud case (Case 3) while the other one was an ATM 
skimming investigation (Case 4). A Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) was signed by 
the authors in order to maintain the confidentiality of the cases, thus preserving the 
privacy rights of those convicted criminals. These four cases were then manually 
analysed by an AccessData Certified Examiner (ACE) via FTK to provide a ground 
truth from which to compare and measure the performance of the approaches presented 
in this paper (i.e., which of the files were notable and which were noise (i.e., those are 
not relevant to the case)). The pre-processing options selected for each case included 
expanding compound files, data carving (on all pre-selected file types) across the 
complete image (allocated and unallocated), entropy test for encryption, and known file 
search (against the NSRL). Case details, including the image size and the total number 
of artefacts, are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Case Details 
Case ID Image Size Total Artefacts Total notables 
Proportion of 
notables (%) 
1 500 MB 11,638 796 6.8 
2 4.5 GB 22,373 11,696 52.2 
3 16 GB 6,654 30 0.4 
4 585 GB 3,456,219 281 0.008 
 
During the analysis process, a list of files (referred to as the File List) was generated 
from the file system as they contain a rich source of information (e.g., MAC date and 
time stamps, file path, or whether it was encrypted). Indeed, the File List contains the 
majority of files that are retrieved within the suspect’s drive and their features, 
providing the most fundamental artefacts to digital evidence examiners. The File List 
was created after core forensic processes had already been undertaken. For examples, 
file hashing against the NSRL was performed and those that matched were removed 
(except for any alerted files). Data carving was also performed. However, the File List 
only presents the first level of metadata. It is recognised that many of the files 
themselves contain a rich source of metadata. It was deemed important to ensure 
clustering of these. Therefore, three application-level metadata files were also created 
based upon an analysis of their respective file repositories. All four metadata categories 
are presented in Table 2. Whilst this is not a definitive list of categories, with other 
application-level metadata categories possible such as Skype, Recycle Bin, Registry, 
and Office documents, these were deemed the most appropriate at this stage for the 
investigation. The features listed in Table 2 present the definitive features utilised in 
this paper. Please note, the encryption feature in the File List was determined by FTK 
based upon an entropy test being performed on each file and the duplicated flag based 
upon the result of the hash. Also the physical and logical sizes differ based upon the 
former being comprised of the logical plus any slack space to the end of the cluster. 
Table 2. Features of different meta-data categories  
Metadata Categories Features 
File List 
 
Creation date and time, access date and time, 
modification date and time, file path, file extension, 
carved, deleted, encrypted, duplicated 
Email 
 
Subject, file name, to, from, cc, bcc, submit date and 
time, delivery date and time, unread, unsent, has 
attachment, physical size, logical size 
EXIF Last write date, last access date, date taken, camera make 
Internet Access date and time, file name, URL, number of hits 
 
Upon the completion of the analysis process, information of the aforementioned four 
metadata categories were exported into individual Comma Separated Value (CSV) files 
for all cases. Each record within the CSV files was then marked as either notable or 
noise according to the result of the manual analysis process, providing a firm foundation 
for evaluating the performance of the proposed method. The marking of each entry was 
merely to establish how well SOM performed - this feature was never given to SOM or 
the subsequent process.  Also, features of each record (as demonstrated in Table 2) were 
enumerated, allowing them to be processed by SOM. Due to the inability of SOM to 
process records with empty entries (e.g., files without a creation time), only records 
with timestamps were selected for a File List SOM – this meant carved files were 
excluded from the File List SOM. Whilst this might create the chance for files not being 
analysed by the File List SOM, it is envisaged that the application-level SOM analysis 
would include them. For example, in a case with a large number of carved JPEGs (such 
as Case 1), whilst the File List SOM would not include them, the EXIF metadata would 
be included within an EXIF-based SOM. The total numbers of records that would be 
processed by the four separate SOMs are illustrated in Table 3. It is worth highlighting 
that due to the case nature, not all cases contain the four SOM categories. For instance, 
Case 3 only contains the File List information as the evidence was imaged from the 
suspect’s USB stick; while Case 4 does not contain the email category as the machine 
was purposely built for committing the ATM skimming crime. The proportions of 
notables from the entire case that were processed by the SOMs are 95%, 8.6%, 100% 
and 100% for Cases 1 to 4 respectively (the figures were calculated based upon the 
information presented within Tables 1 and 3). Also, Case 2 was an interesting example 
of where a large number of notables were carved files (executable files related to 
hacking software), resulting them being excluded from the SOM analysis. The impact 
of this will be discussed in Section 6.  
Table 3. The number of records for each category of the four cases (: Notable; : Noise)1 
Case 
ID 
File List 
SOM 
Email 
SOM 
EXIF 
SOM 
Internet 
SOM Total 
          
1 456 1,215 3 52 229 0 65 2,105 753 3,372 
2 871 4,469 29 44 - - 101 665 1,001 5,178 
3 30 3,441 - - - - - - 30 3,441 
4 261 116,880 - - 20 226 0 1,303 281 118,409 
4 Experimental Methodology and Results for SOM Clustering  
The purpose of the experiment was to determine whether metadata across a range of 
types is useful in automatically identifying notable versus noise files. Therefore, the 
experiment had two objectives: 
• to investigate whether SOM can be utilised for clustering artefacts and if that were 
the case,  
• to determine the influence of the network sizes upon the accuracy. 
For each category (i.e., File List, Email, EXIF and Internet) within each of the four 
cases, the SOM neural network was configured with the following network sizes: 3x3 
(9), 5x5 (25), 7x7 (49), 9x9 (81), and 10x10 (100). The SOMs were initialised randomly 
and with the aim of assuring the stability of the SOM result, the experiment was 
repeated 5 times for each metadata category of the four cases across all configurations. 
Hence, a total of 275 (11x5x5) sets of results were obtained. For each configuration, all 
records within a particular category (e.g., File List) were presented with all available 
features (as demonstrated in Tables 2 and 3). Details of these experimental results are 
presented and discussed in the following sections. The clusters were each analysed to 
identify the proportion of notables and noise files they contain. 
                                                          
1  This also applies to Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
The experiment was conducted within the MATLAB R2013a environment on a 
Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit Operating System with Intel Core i7-2600 CPU (3.4 GHz) 
and 16 GB memory (Matlab, 2015). MATLAB was chosen due to its ease in data 
manipulation and the availability of the SOM neural network. 
4.1 File List 
As illustrated in Table 4, in three of the four cases, clustering based upon the File 
List alone proved very successful. For cases 1, 3 and 4, all notable files were obtained 
within rank-five clusters with at least 56.4% noise files clusters in the remaining 
clusters by using the 3x3 SOM configuration. Indeed, Case 1 was able to identify 100% 
of notables (within three clusters) with 59.3% of the noise being grouped in the other 
six clusters. While Case 4, identified 100% of the notables in a single cluster and only 
introduced 1.6% of the noise. In comparison, only Case 2 did not identify all notable 
files within rank-five clusters – it was able to cluster 93.5% of notables at a cost of 
including 53.5% of the noise files – still resulting in a huge reduction in the number of 
files an investigator would need to analyse if these five clusters were successfully 
identified during an investigation. Also, the worst result was given by the 10x10 
network in Case 2: only 32.4% of the notables were collected within the rank-five 
clusters, with the remaining 67.6% scattered around the other 95 clusters. 
Table 4. Experimental results for the File List category of the 4 cases2 
Network Size 9 25 49 81 100 
Case 
ID 
Cluster 
ID 
          
1 
1 88.8 15.3 38.4 5.4 21.9 1.6 10.3 0 11 1 
2 8.6 15.4 23.2 0.2 12.7 0 9.0 0.7 8.1 0 
3 2.6 10 18.2 1.6 11.2 1 8.6 0.3 7 0.1 
4 - - 16.7 0 9.6 0 7.9 0 6.8 0 
5 - - 2.6 9.3 9.4 0 7 0.3 5.7 0.2 
* 0 59.3 0.9 83.5 35.2 97.4 57.2 98.7 61.4 98.7 
2 
1 38.7 18.9 16 5.3 13.1 2.1 9.9 0.9 9.9 0.9 
2 27.3 20.6 14.2 15 9.9 0.9 8.4 0.6 6 4.5 
3 14.8 2.9 12.4 1.9 8.5 10.9 7 0.1 5.7 0.1 
4 7.3 8.1 9.9 0.9 7.9 2.7 6.7 4.8 5.4 3 
5 5.4 3 7.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 5.4 3 5.4 1.7 
* 6.5 46.5 39.6 73.6 53.3 80.1 62.6 90.6 67.6 89.8 
3 1 56.7 8.7 56.7 8.8 43.3 3.3 43.3 3.3 23.3 1 2 20 0.6 20 0.3 20 0.3 20 0.2 20 2.3 
                                                          
2  *: Remaining Clusters; the best performances obtained by SOM are indicated by the grey 
shaded cells; the clusters are rank ordered based upon the proportion of notables grouped 
within them and the first 5 ranks are chosen for the demonstration purpose. This also applies 
to Tables 5, 6 and 7; 
3 10 6.6 10 6.6 10 3.8 13.3 2.2 20 0.3 
4 6.7 13.8 6.7 4.4 6.7 3.7 10 1.7 6.7 0.6 
5 6.7 13.9 6.7 4 6.7 4.6 6.7 1.6 6.7 1 
* 0 56.4 0 75.9 13.3 84.3 6.7 91 23.3 94.8 
4 1 100 16.3 100 3.8 100 2.3 100 1.9 100 1.6 * 0 83.7 0 96.2 0 97.7 0 98.1 0 98.4 
 
Notably, as the SOM network size increases, both the identification rate of notable 
files and the volume of noise files decreases. For example, in Case 1, the percentage of 
notables from the 3x3 SOM to the 10x10 SOM reduces from 100% to 38.6% with a 
subsequent increase in the number of noise files being clustered from 59.3% to 98.7%. 
If this approach was used as a triage tool to identify whether notable files exist on the 
image (rather than identifying all notable files) this setting would provide 38.6% of 
notable files at a cost of 1.3% of noise files enabling the investigator to quickly 
understand the nature of evidence present. 
4.2 Email 
The results for the Email category where available are illustrated in Table 5. Please 
note, email was only present in two of the four cases. All the artefacts (both notables 
and noise) were grouped in one cluster for both cases; although around one quarter of 
the noise artefacts were separated from the notables for the network sizes 81 and 100 
for Case 1. Reasons for this phenomenon could be due to the small amount of total 
email artefacts (53 and 73 for Cases 1 and 2 respectively), or a high level of similarities 
that were presented within them (i.e., the majority of them were clustered in a single 
cluster).    
Table 5. Experimental results for the Email category of Cases 1 and 2 
Network Size 9 25 49 81 100 
Case ID Cluster ID           
1 
1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 76.9 100 73.1 
* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23.1 0 26.9 
2 
1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.3 EXIF 
As illustrated by Table 6, all the EXIF files within Case 1 were notables; the results 
also highlight that SOM is capable of sorting data according to their similarities. In 
contrast with the results presented by Case 4, a better set of outcomes are observed as 
90% of the notable files were grouped within two clusters by using the network size 9 
configuration.      
Table 6. Experimental results for the EXIF category of Cases 1 and 4 
Network Size 9 25 49 81 100 
Case ID Cluster ID           
1 
1 49.3 - 15.7 - 10.0 - 7.4 - 9.2 - 
2 41.5 - 8.7 - 8.7 - 4.4 - 3.9 - 
3 2.6 - 7.9 - 7.4 - 4.4 - 3.5 - 
4 2.2 - 7.4 - 5.7 - 4.4 - 3.1 - 
5 2.2 - 7.4 - 5.7 - 3.5 - 3.1 - 
* 2.2 - 52.9 - 62.5 - 75.9 - 77.2 - 
4 
1 50 7.5 50 2.2 40 1.3 40 1.3 40 0 
2 40 3.5 40 1.3 35 0 35 0 30 1.3 
3 5 11.9 5 5.3 15 2.2 15 1.8 10 0 
4 5 11.9 5 6.2 5 0.4 5 0.4 10 2.2 
5 - - - - 5 3.1 5 2.2 5 0.4 
* 0 65.2 0 85 0 93 0 94.3 5 96.1 
 
Regarding Case 4, more than 95% of the notables can be found within the rank-five 
clusters for all network configurations; also the proportion of noise within the these five 
clusters reduces significantly as the network size increases: 34.8% of noise for the 
network size 9 in comparison with only 3.9% for the network size 100. Moreover, 100% 
of notable files can be observed under the network sizes 49, 81 and 100, reinforcing 
that SOM can be used for clustering information with a very high performance. 
4.4 Internet 
The results for Cases 1, 2 and 4 are presented in Table 7 (Case 3 did not contain any 
Internet activity). At least 78.5% and 55.4% of the notables were grouped within the 
rank-five clusters for Cases 1 and 2 respectively. The best performance (in terms of the 
proportion of notables) was obtained by using the network size 25 for Case 1: 100% of 
the notables were distributed in four clusters with only 18.8% of the total noise being 
clustered within. For Case 2, the worst performance was achieved under the 
configuration of the 10x10 network: only 55.4% of the notables were successfully 
clustered by the SOM within the rank-five clusters; however, due to the high density of 
notables within each cluster (4 with 100% of notables and 1 with 83.3% of notables), 
merely 2 noise artefacts (i.e., 0.3% of total noise in the case) were classified within 
those five clusters. 
 
Table 7. Experimental results for the Internet category of Cases 1, 2 and 4 
Network Size 9 25 49 81 100 
Case 
ID Cluster ID           
1 1 35.4 13.5 33.8 3 33.8 2.5 23.1 1.1 23.1 1 
2 33.8 9.8 23.1 7 21.5 3.8 23.1 2.8 23.1 1.4 
3 20 3.9 23.1 4.9 20 3.9 13.8 1.9 12.3 1 
4 10.8 11.4 20 3.9 12.3 3.4 10.8 1.9 10.8 2 
5 - - - - 10.8 3.8 9.2 0.9 9.2 0.3 
* 0 61.4 0 81.2 1.6 82.6 20 91.4 21.5 94.3 
2 
1 41.6 5.9 18.8 1.1 15.8 2.9 15.8 2.9 15.8 0 
2 25.7 7.5 17.8 0.2 14.9 0.2 10.9 0.2 11.9 0 
3 15.8 11 15.8 7.2 13.9 0.8 9.9 0.2 9.9 0.3 
4 14.9 11.3 14.9 1.7 12.9 0.6 9.9 0 8.9 0 
5 1 13.8 9.9 0.3 9.9 0.3 9.9 0.3 8.9 0 
* 1 50.5 22.8 89.5 32.6 95.2 43.6 96.4 44.6 99.7 
4 
1 - 15.7 - 12.7 - 4 - 3.7 - 3.5 
2 - 14.7 - 6.8 - 3.8 - 2.7 - 2.4 
3 - 14.3 - 5.7 - 3.5 - 2.5 - 2.3 
4 - 14.1 - 5.7 - 3.3 - 2.4 - 2.2 
5 - 14 - 5.7 - 3.2 - 2.2 - 1.8 
* - 27.2 - 63.5 - 82.1 - 86.6 - 87.7 
 
The Internet history of Case 4 was also processed despite no notables being 
presented within this category as in practice no one would know whether a file is 
notable or not unless it is examined. It helps to highlight the problem in practice of 
identifying the most appropriate network size – as a network size of 9 would result in 
an investigator having to analyse 72.8% of noise files, whereas a network size of 100 
would offer the number of noise files to be analysed reduce to 12.3% if the rank-five 
clusters were selected. 
4.5 Further Analysis 
In general, a larger proportion of notables can be obtained with the rank-five clusters 
by using smaller SOM network sizes (e.g., 9 or 25); however, a considerable amount 
of noise files were also observed. A reduction in the noise can be achieved by choosing 
larger SOM network sizes (e.g., 81 or 100) with a compromise of the number of 
notables (as demonstrated in Fig. 1). Also, when the SOM network size increases, more 
clusters with a higher density of notables start to appear. Therefore, the granularity of 
the results is proportional to the sizes of the SOM network: smaller network sizes 
provide for coarser grained results while larger network sizes for finer grained outputs. 
This in part is obvious due to the larger number of clusters available. The need to be 
able to determine which network size to utilise is likely to be driven by the aim of the 
investigator (e.g., to obtain all notables at the cost of picking up more noise or obtain 
some notables to confirm the image has relevant content at the expense of very little 
noise). 
 
 
 Fig. 1. Comparison on Notables and Noise in the rank-five clusters of the Case 3 File List on 
various network configurations 
5 Automated Evidence Profiler 
The previous section has highlighted that SOM-based analysis does have the 
potential to cluster notable versus noise files to a degree that would significantly reduce 
the investigation time. The research question that now arises is how to identify which 
clusters to analyse first – selecting the wrong clusters will lead the investigator to 
analyse a large number of noise files rather than notables. The following section 
describes a novel process for identifying and analysing relevant clusters and proceeds 
to present an evaluation of the approach. 
5.1 Automated Evidence Profiler Process 
The Automated Evidence Profiler (AEP) splits the problem of identifying relevant 
clusters into two aspects: 
 
• How to identify the very first cluster to analyse 
• How to identify subsequent clusters across the different metadata SOMs 
Also, the AEP needs to maximise the number of notable files identified whilst looking 
to minimise the number of noise files included. 
 
The solution to the first problem is based upon prior work completed in profiling 
criminal behaviour. It recognises that certain crime types will result in particular file 
formats being more likely to contain notable files than others. For example, child abuse 
cases will typically result in image-based files. The Department of Justice (DoJ) 
published a mapping of computer-based criminal activities versus file types (DoJ, 
2001). The AEP uses this information to identify the first cluster within the File List 
SOM that contains the greatest number of these file types based upon the intelligence 
of the criminal activity. 
 
In order to solve the issue of incorporating the results from the differing SOMs (File 
List and application-level SOMs) and to maximise the number of notable files 
identified, AEP proposes an approach that focuses upon analysing the timeline of files 
identified in the first cluster. The underlying assumption being applied is that when a 
suspect interacts with a file, the criminal activity is likely to involve other artefacts that 
are also notable within a short period of time (can be identified based upon their MAC 
times). For example, viewing a notable image is likely to involve viewing several 
images rather than a single image in isolation. Or the image is attached to an email and 
sent to another suspect. Fig. 2 illustrates the high-level process of AEP – from the initial 
crime mapping, to the creation of evidence trails and their subsequent prioritisation. 
The final step in the AEP process is to seek to improve upon the original crime mapping 
by feeding back into the process with the file types that have been identified as notable 
provide an adaptive and more reflective crime mapping. This process will also account 
for changes in criminal activities and how technology is used over time. For example, 
if a particular criminal activity begins to work with different file types, this process will 
account for this and ensure they are included. Whilst this feedback mechanism is 
proposed in this research, the evaluation did not include this aspect. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Automated Evidence Profiler Process 
 
The core of the AEP process is the creation of evidence trails and their prioritisation. 
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the initial identified cluster will give rise to a number of files 
within it. Each file is taken in turn and a time window (e.g., 30 seconds, 1 minute, or 2 
minutes) is applied to the accessed timestamp in both time directions (i.e., before and 
after) in order to create an evidence trail (i.e., finding any related artefacts within the 
given time window). Then these related artefacts are added to a global list of artefacts 
for the case. Having analysed all the files in the cluster, the resulting list of related 
artefacts is then sorted based upon the SOM in which the artefact resides and the cluster 
ID. The next cluster to be analysed is the one that appears most frequently within that 
global list. For example, as illustrated in Fig 3, based upon Evidence Trail 1, Internet 
Browser activity was identified as an action that took place shortly after the identified 
“Child.jpg” artefact (from the first cluster). If upon completion of the analysis of all the 
files from the first cluster, the cluster from the Internet SOM to which the Facebook-
Clare exists appeared most frequently; that cluster would be the next one to be 
analysed. When it is, Evidence Trail 4 will be created. The process then repeats as often 
as required. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Example of Evidence Trails 
 
 
All of the analysed artefacts will be included in the final report to the investigator. The 
final aspect of the process is to provide some degree of prioritisation of the artefacts. 
This is achieved through an analysis of the frequency by which the artefact has been 
identified – with reoccurring artefacts more likely to be key notable artefacts that a 
suspect has interacted with in comparison to infrequent used artefacts. 
5.2 AEP Evaluation 
 
An evaluation of the AEP process was performed utilising the aforementioned cases 
presented in section 3. Within the evaluation, impacts of three key parameters of the 
AEP are also tested: 
 
• Time Window (TW) – whilst the assumption that criminal activities are not 
undertaken in isolation may intuitively seem correct, the size of the TW will 
have an impact on the number of notables and noise files (with the former 
decreasing and the latter increasing if the TW is too large). 
• Number of clusters to be analysed – how many iterations of the process are 
necessary before the number of notable artefacts diminishes and the number 
of noise files increases. Too few iterations will result in insufficient notable 
artefacts being identified – too many and the process will present more noise 
files for the approach to be useful. 
• Network size – as indicated in the previous section, the relationship between 
notables and noise files are closely related to the network size 
In addition, it is also important to investigate whether the AEP process is able to 
incorporate the results of the other SOMs – rather than merely analysing clusters within 
the File List SOM. 
 
Table 8 illustrates the best-case results (and the algorithmic parameters required for the 
result). Given the only investigator interaction required in this process is to select the 
crime category, the process achieved recall rates (proportion of notable files identified) 
of between 75.3 to 93%. As the main aim of the digital investigation is to find as much 
evidence as possible, the recall rate achieved by the AEP is promising as at least three 
quarters of the notables files were identified across the four cases. While the precision 
rate is low in terms of what an average clustering technique enabled system can achieve, 
this phenomena could be caused by a number of factors, including the use of smaller 
network sizes, the lower number of notable artefacts, and the proportion of notables 
within the case (e.g. only 0.008% of the artefacts were notables in Case 4). It is worth 
highlighting, in terms of the computational time required, most of the analysis took a 
relatively trivial amount of time (in the order of minutes); however, Case 4 (with a large 
number of artefacts to process) did take on average an hour to process. In comparison 
to many forensic analyses this is not significant; however, it is worth highlighting and 
noting as an opportunity for future research. Overall, the investigator can still save huge 
amount of time when the AEP process is applied to analyse the case.  
 
Table 8. Overall Performance of the AEP Process 
Case Recall Precision F Process Parameters 
ID (%) (%) measure SOM 
Network 
Size 
TW 
(minute) 
SOM 
Iteration 
Time 
(minute) 
1 93 34.4 0.5 9 2 3 1 
2 75.3 36.3 0.49 9 0.5 2 7  
3 76.7 12.9 0.22 49 2 2 1  
4 92.8 0.5 0.01 100 0.5 1 ~60 
 
Fig. 4 illustrates the impact upon performance the TW has across differing network 
sizes. Generally as expected, beyond a certain TW, the proportion of noise files 
significantly increases with a disproportionate change in the notable artefacts identified. 
There appears to be a “sweet spot” at around the 2-5 minute window. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Impact of the Time Window on Performance 
 
In terms of how many SOM iterations should be analysed, the graphs illustrated in Fig. 
5 show it is more dependent on the size of the SOM network utilised, which in turn 
appears to have a dependency on the number of artefacts to be processed. Cases with 
larger numbers of artefacts appear to operate better in larger SOM network 
configurations (although the limited number of cases analysed merely suggest this 
rather than definitively indicate it). 
 
Fig. 5. Impact of Cluster Iterations on Performance 
 
The final aspect of the investigation was to ensure the process was able to incorporate 
notable files that are contained in clusters pertaining to the other SOMs (i.e., EXIF, 
Internet and Email). For simplicity, Table 9 illustrates the effect of the process upon 
Case 1 and 2 versus three network configurations with four iterations. The first number 
indicates the SOM type and the second the cluster ID. In both of these cases it is clear 
that clusters from all relevant SOMs (where they exist) are being included within the 
analysis for notable files. For example, clusters from all four SOMs are included in 
Case 1. 
 
Table 9. SOM and Cluster IDs Identified 
 
Network Size 9 25 49 
Case ID TW 13 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1 
0.5 1,7 1,5 4,3 1,8 1,1 1,4 1,5 1,20 1,18 1,21 3,1 1,42 
1 1,7 1,5 4,3 1,8 1,1 1,25 3,17 3,21 1,18 1,6 3,1 3,8 
2 1,1 1,2 1,6 3,4 1,1 2,17 1,7 1,3 1,25 1,1 1,2 1,27 
5 1,7 1,8 1,6 1,3 1,1 2,13 1,15 3,1 1,1 1,4 1,19 4,42 
10 1,7 4,5 1,8 4,3 1,3 3,1 3,6 3,10 1,33 2,1 2,4 4,23 
20 1,7 4,5 1,8 1,6 1,2 3,15 3,16 3,22 1,18 4,46 4,24 4,17 
                                                          
3 Iteration ID 
30 1,1 4,5 1,8 1,6 1,1 2,25 3,2 3,3 1,31 3,3 3,4 3,10 
2 
0.5 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,6 1,7 1,10 1,16 1,1 1,22 1,47 1,43 1,12 
1 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,5 1,7 1,16 1,25 1,13 1,22 1,39 1,47 1,48 
2 1,4 1,1 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,25 1,16 1,21 1,22 1,47 1,40 1,48 
5 1,1 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,13 1,16 1,25 1,22 1,36 1,27 1,8 
10 1,1 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,16 1,25 1,2 1,22 1,43 1,37 1,27 
20 1,1 1,4 2,9 4,5 1,7 4,14 4,19 4,18 1,22 1,43 4,20 4,13 
30 1,1 4,3 4,5 2,9 1,7 4,14 4,19 4,18 1,22 1,43 4,7 4,13 
(Key: 1=File List SOM; 2=Email SOM; 3=EXIF SOM; 4=Internet SOM) 
 
6 Discussion  
Based upon the results presented in Tables 4-7, the application of SOM to artefact 
identification works well – showing that notable artefacts can be correlated based upon 
metadata that is derived from it. Indeed, for each of the categories (i.e., File List, Email, 
EXIF, and Internet) through all four cases, more than 93.5% of notables were grouped 
within the rank-five clusters at least under one SOM network configuration with at less 
than half of the noise files being included. The best performance of all results (in terms 
of grouping most notables within the rank-five clusters and also minimising the 
proportion of noise) was achieved by using the 10x10 network for the File List in Case 
4 – all the notables were clustered in a single cell with only 1.6% of the total noise 
being present.  
Case 2 has proven to be challenging, both in the identification of notable versus noise 
files but also in the inclusion of sufficient notable files in the first place. The latter 
problem has the potential to be rectified through the inclusion of more application-level 
metadata SOMs. For example, a Recycle Bin SOM that extracts the metadata from the 
INFO2 (pre Windows Vista) or $I (Windows Vista and newer) would have identified 
previously deleted applications (as was the issue in Case 2). The same argument could 
be made for a variety of other application-level SOMs, including Microsoft Office files 
where metadata is extracted from the header, Skype SOM that extracts Skype call 
records and chat interactions, and Log SOMs that extract application and user based 
log records. The reason for the poor identification performance with the artefacts that 
were included in Case 2 is less clear; however, it is notable that having applied the AEP 
process the overall performance was commensurate with the remaining cases – 
achieving a recall rate of 75.3%. So whilst the SOM might have had some weaknesses, 
the proposed AEP process has counteracted these. 
The results from the AEP more generally are also very encouraging. Whilst ideally 
it would best to have identified all notable files (i.e., 100% recall rate), an appreciation 
of the issues regarding the volume of data, time taken to investigate, and the likelihood 
of human investigative error means the opportunity of undertaking a “gold standard” 
investigation is becoming less and less likely in the future. Therefore, more “intelligent” 
approaches, such as those proposed in this paper, provide a basis upon which simpler 
more technically trivial cases (which represent a large proportion of the day-to-day 
activities for law enforcement forensic investigators) can be undertaken, reducing (not 
removing or replacing) the time taken for an investigator to confirm the nature of the 
case and to present the relevant evidence in a report. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
The paper has presented an empirical study investigating the possibility of using SOM 
to cluster notable files for digital forensic investigations in an unsupervised manner – a 
significant enhancement over existing approaches. The experimental results show the 
analysis of file system and application-level metadata offers a good level of 
performance. It should be highlighted that in contrary to much of the literature in digital 
forensics, the purpose of this paper is to further the body of knowledge in the 
application of machine learning to digital forensics for the purpose of automated 
artefact identification. As such the paper has presented an investigation in the approach, 
developed a model and evaluated the model parameters to illustrate the impact upon 
performance. It is not the objective of the paper to present a forensic tool, nor to 
advocate that such an approach would remove the necessity of an investigator. The 
approach presented is the building block upon which further research can seek to refine 
and evaluate with a view to providing a triage tool that could assist in a range of 
computer-related crimes. The net effect will be to free up more investigative time for 
more technically complex cases (such as those involving the use of advanced data 
hiding and anti-forensics). 
Future work will focus upon investigating the effectiveness of other unsupervised 
machine learning approaches and seek to evaluate the proposed AEP process against a 
greater range of cases. Further work also needs to be undertaken to investigate the wider 
architectural aspects of implementing such an approach in practice – for example, the 
visualisation of the identified artefacts in order to enable a faster appreciation of their 
status and relevance by an investigator. This could also include a feedback loop that 
allows the system to adapt to changes in the identification process given by decisions 
from a trained and experienced investigator. 
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